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Divestment constitutes an important method of corporate restructuring. Despite this fact, the 
banking literature on divestment is very limited. In this text, we try to remediate partially to the 
shortcomings of the existing literature by examining empirically the role of external factors. Using a 
large sample of 313 transactions, we have established that parent companies originate from coun-
tries with relatively high accumulated wealth, slow GDP growth, stable macroeconomic situation 
and dominant bank intermediation in financial system. The acquirers in turn come from poorer 
countries with faster economic growth and relatively more market-oriented financial systems. 
Those results broadly conform with the predictions of three hypotheses formulated in the text, 
namely the weak performance hypothesis, the corporate governance hypothesis and the rebalanc-
ing hypothesis.
Introduction
Divestments in banking mainly take the form of the 
subsidiary sell-offs. They constitute, as Brauer (2006) 
notices, the element of corporate portfolio restructur-
ing alongside dissolutions and consolidation activity. 
They have far-reaching consequences. Divestments af-
fect industry structures and competition, firm strategy 
and performance, employees’ motivation and commit-
ment. The literature on divestments is unbalanced. The 
studies on non-financial firms are numerous, whereas 
those on financial intermediaries are very rare. This is 
why we have undertaken a long-term research project 
concerning divestments in banking. This article pres-
ents preliminary evidence on the role played in this 
process by external factors. By the external factors, we 
mean macroeconomic variables and variables charac-
terizing financial system. 
The reminder of the article is organized as follows. 
Section 1 introduces the literature review. Section 2 
describes the dataset and our theoretical expectations. 
In section 3, we present the empirical results. The last 
section presents the conclusion. 
1. Literature Review
1.1. Banking literature.
As we have already mentioned, the banking literature-
 dealing with the problem of divestment is very limited
. We are aware of only three studies in this field. Leung et
 al. (2008) constructed a theoretical model of the entry
 and exit decisions based on the differential returns
  in  a  host  and  home  market.  Using  this
 model, they empirically examined the entry and exit 
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decisions  for  the  period  of  1981-2001  in  the  Hong 
Kong banking system. They discovered that the deci-
sion to divest is precipitated by the lesser international 
diversification of a bank, its non-Asian origin and the 
slower trade growth of the bank’s home country with 
Hong Kong. Leung et al. established additionally that 
the worsening banking sector condition and political 
instability increased the number of divestments.  
Hryckiewicz & Kowalewski (2010, 2011) in two re-
lated papers investigated the motivations for divestment 
activities in the banking industry. In the first one, they 
analyzed  81  transactions  conducted  during  the  1999-
2006 period. In the second one, they took into account 
149 divestments accomplished between 1997 and 2009. 
Independent of the samples used and the methodologies 
applied, Hryckiewicz & Kowalewski reached similar con-
clusions. They found that the financial distress existing in 
the parent company constituted the main driving force 
behind the decision to sell a foreign subsidiary. Hryck-
iewicz & Kowalewski also showed that the probability of 
divestment increases when a financial crisis strikes the 
home country. In their opinion, the poor performance of 
a subsidiary plays only a secondary role.  
1.2. Corporate finance literature.
The researchers in the field of corporate finance inves-
tigated three key issues related to divestments: motives 
for divestment decisions, market reactions to the an-
nouncements of divestments and consequences of di-
vestment transactions. Excellent and extensive reviews 
of those strands of literature are provided by Brauer 
(2006), Decher & Mellewight (2007a, 2007b). There-
fore, we will restrain our analysis to the selected and 
representative works. 
1.2.1. Motives.
As  far  as  motives  for  divestments  are  concerned, 
Denis et al. (1997) provided evidence that firms did 
not refocus their activity voluntarily, but only under 
market pressure. They used a sample of 933 U.S. firms, 
excluding entities from the financial services and the 
regulated utilities industries. Denis et al. documented 
that in the years 1985-1989, the decreases in diversifi-
cation were strongly stimulated by market disciplinary 
mechanisms, such as important ownership changes, 
take-over attempts, financial problems and manage-
ment turnover. 
Hayenes et al. (2003) analyzed divestment motives us-
ing a unique panel of 144 large, publicly quoted UK firms. 
They measured divestment activity by both the count of 
operations completed in a given year and the share of as-
sets sold. Their empirical evidence suggested that divest-
ments constituted a rational managerial response to the 
changing business conditions. Hayenes et al. found that 
divestment is positively related to weak financial perfor-
mance and that the reaction to unsatisfactory financial 
results is quite rapid. The divestment activity in UK de-
pends also on the managerial discretion, which in turn is 
shaped by the degree of financial leverage and the char-
acter of corporate governance mechanisms. Moreover, a 
take-over threat stimulates decision to divest. As expect-
ed, divestments seem to be a method of solving control 
problems caused by scale or diversification. 
Denis  &  Kruse  (2000)  examined  the  relationship 
between important performance declines and the fre-
quency  of  actions  disciplining  managers  undertake 
(corporate  takeovers,  board  dismissals,  and  share-
holder  activism).  Additionally,  they  studied  the  de-
terminants of corporate restructuring (among others, 
divestments). They found that in the sample of 350 
firms from the U.S., restructuring usually follows the 
noticeable decline in profitability. This conclusion is 
similar to Hayenes et al. (2003). However, in contrast 
to the British market, corporate restructuring is not 
correlated with the intensity of take-over activities. 
Traditional theories of motives for divestment were 
questioned by Zhou et al. (2011). They particularly chal-
lenged the view that the financial crisis stimulated the 
decision to divest. A large body of literature suggested 
that the probability of selling a subsidiary rises during 
the crisis because of the financial constraints, aggravated 
agency problems (the threat of expropriation of minor-
ity shareholders) and increased market discipline. Zhou 
et al. (2011), using a sample of 214 Thai firms, showed 
that the 1997 Asian financial crisis did not encourage 
domestic corporation to divest.  In reality, this group of 
firms reduced divestitures following the crisis.  
1.2.2. Market reactions.
Afshar et al. (1992) studied market reactions using the 
sample, which comprises 178 divestments announced 
by U.K listed companies in the years 1985-1986. In 
the final sample, 92 announcements concern sell-off 
completions and 86 intentions to divest. Afsar et al. 32 K. Jackowicz, O. Kowalewski
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found that generally sell-off announcements are posi-
tively received by capital markets. On the event day, 
the mean abnormal return equals 0.85%. The increase 
in shareholder wealth is larger when the completion 
of divestiture is announced and the transaction price 
is declared. The abnormal return is also positively in-
fluenced by the size of the divestment process. More-
over. financial problems of the divesting company play 
an important role. The weaker the financial condition 
of the seller, the greater is the abnormal return on the 
event day. This relationship supports the hypothesis 
that  some  divestments  are  regarded  as  bankruptcy 
avoidance methods. 
Guedes  &  Parayre  (1997)  remarked  in  turn  that 
market reactions depend on the performance of the 
division being sold. They identify 370 events of divest-
ment announcements in the U.S. For the entire sam-
ple, the stock market return is 1.6% and statistically 
significant. However, for the subsample of successful 
divisions, the market reaction is stronger (2.5%) and 
again statistically significant. In contrast, when firms 
announce their intention to sell under-performing di-
visions, the stock market return is not statistically dis-
tinguishable from zero. Guedes & Parayre explained 
this phenomenon by the full market anticipation of the 
attempts to sell losing divisions. 
Gleason et al. (2000) broadened the analysis of di-
vestment wealth effects since they examined abnormal 
returns for sellers and acquirers. The sample encom-
passes 244 foreign divestments initiated by U.S. multi-
national corporations in the 1980-1996 period.  Glea-
son et al. documented that the capital market judges 
both sales and purchases of divested entities as value-
enhancing. The abnormal return recorded by acquirers 
and sellers equals to 0.48% and 0.65%, corresponding-
ly. Market reactions are positively related to leverages 
and measures of efficient asset utilization.
1.2.3. Consequences.
Conglomerates in the mature economies are usually 
traded at a discount in comparison with the portfolio 
of undiversified firms. Burch & Nanda (2003) argued 
that this discount can be ascribed to the diversity in in-
vestment opportunities that exacerbates agency prob-
lems. They analyzed 106 spin-off transactions initiated 
by U.S. companies during the 1979-1996 period and 
found that the reduction in diversity plays an impor-
tant role in explaining the market value gains to spin-
offs. Ahn & Denis (2004) obtained similar results as 
far  as  relative  investment  inefficiency  of  diversified 
firms is concerned. Their sample is composed of 150 
spin-offs completed by U.S. firms between 1981 and 
1996. They demonstrate that after the divestiture, the 
discount, at which diversified companies are traded, 
disappears. Ahn & Denis pointed to the improvement 
in investment allocation as an explanation for this phe-
nomenon. 
Çolak & Whited (2007) challenged the findings of 
earlier  studies  that  divestments  led  to  the  improve-
ments  in  investment  efficiency.  They  hypothesized 
that  these  analyses  suffered  from  endogeneity  and 
measurement problems. Using the database covering 
154 spin-offs  and 267 divestitures, they showed that 
the same factors are responsible for inducing firms to 
sell assets and to increase investment efficiency. Hence, 
spin-offs and divestitures do not cause improvements 
in  the  investment  efficiency,  but  simply  coincide  in 
time with these  improvements. 
1.2.4. Other issues.
The existing literature on divestiture in the field of cor-
porate finance, as we have mentioned, concentrates on 
three topics: the motives for the decision to divest, the 
wealth effects of this decision and its consequences for 
investment efficiency. Owen & Yawson (2006) inves-
tigated instead the decision where to divest and they 
filled an evident gap in the literature. They analyzed 
345 Australian companies, which in the period span-
ning from 1992 to 2003, sold at least one domestic 
or  international  subsidiary.  They  documented  that 
Australian parent companies are more likely to sell a 
subsidiary overseas when these companies have a large 
scale of operations, offer low dividend yields and are 
highly geographically diversified. Aditionally, Owen & 
Yawson presented evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that overseas divestiture operations aim at concentrat-
ing on core business areas. 
2. Data and Theoretical Expectations
We  have  gathered  data  on  313  divestment  transac-
tions in banking around the world, which took place 
between 1997 and 2010. The number of transactions 
per year fluctuated between 8 in 1997 and 34 in 2003.     
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concerning deal values. The data about divestments 
were retrieved from the Zephyr database compiled by 
Bureau van Dijk, the data on macroeconomic trends 
and on financial systems from the World Bank data-
bases: the World Development Indicators and Finan-
cial Structure. As Figure 1 illustrates, the distribution 
of shares sold is highly skewed and dominated by total 
withdrawals out of the foreign markets. In our sample, 
parent companies sold 233 times 100% stakes in for-
eign banking subsidiaries. 
The mean value of divestment transactions (in the sub-
sample of 170 deals) equals to 627 million euros, the 
median value is much lower and equals to 78 million 
euros. This difference suggests again a skewed charac-
ter of the appropriate empirical distribution. Figure 
2, showing the distribution of deal values, confirms 
this hypothesis. As expected, the divestment process 
encompasses mainly relatively low value transactions 
(under 2 billion euros). 
On the basis of the literature findings and the gener-
al economic knowledge, we advance three hypotheses 
about the role of the external factors in the divestment 
processes. Firstly, the literature strongly suggests that 
the portfolio restructuring is stimulated by weak per-
formance. In banking, a decline in profitability is fre-
quently connected with unfavorable macroeconomic 
trends.  Therefore,  we  expect  that  countries,  from 
which parent companies, i.e. sellers, originate, should 
be characterized by slower growth and higher unem-
ployment. Shortly, we will call this preposition the hy-
pothesis of weak performance. Secondly, the literature 
documents  that  corporate  governance  mechanisms 
play an important role in corporate diversification and 
refocusing. Hence, we predict that sellers, especially in 
the second part of the period under study, should come 
from countries with weaker managerial discipline, i.e. 
countries dominantly with financial systems based on 
financial intermediation. We will name this preposi-
tion as the corporate governance hypothesis. The final 
hypothesis of global rebalancing relies on the assump-
tion  that  divestments  should  reflect  the  changes  in 
relative economic power in the world. This is why we 
forecast that acquirers should originate from countries 
with lower accumulated wealth, less stable economies 
but higher GDP growth than in the parent companies 
from the countries of origin. 
3. Results
3.1. GDP growth and level
The real GDP growth is the slowest in the group of 
countries,  where  parent  companies  are  chartered. 
The mean real GDP growth in the parent company 
Figure 1. Empirical distribution of stakes sold
stake sold 
number of 
transactions 
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Source: Own study.34 K. Jackowicz, O. Kowalewski
10.5709/ce.1897-9254.10 DOI:  CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS
Vol. 5 Issue2 30-41 2011
Figure 2. Empirical distribution of deal values (in million euros)
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countries, as indicated by Panel A of Table 1, is one 
percentage point lower than in the acquirer countries 
and more than 1.5 percentage point lower than in the 
countries hosting the subsidiary entities. All the differ-
ences are statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level.   
The identified relationships among GDP growth rates 
are stable in time. As Figure 3 documents, the growth 
rates in countries, where subsidiaries and acquirers are 
located, almost always exceed those registered in coun-
tries of the parent companies. Those results are gen-
erally consistent with our hypotheses of weak perfor-
mance and rebalancing. They come also as no surprise 
since  obviously  parent  companies  originate  mainly 
from  mature  economies.  Additionally,  they  suggest 
that the decision to sell a subsidiary could be related to 
the situation in the owners’ country and does not have 
to be determined by the bad economic perspectives in 
the country, where a subsidiary operates.
GDP  per  capita  adjusted  for  differences  in  pur-
chasing power is the highest in the parent companies’ 
countries of origin. As Panel B of Table 1 shows, its 
mean value there reaches 29 thousand US dollars and 
is almost 10 thousand US dollars higher than in the 
group of countries, where subsidiary entities are lo-
cated. The mean value of GDP per capita for acquirer’s 
countries is situated in the middle of this range and 
equals  to  24  thousand  US  dollars  as  forecasted  by 
the rebalancing hypothesis. The wealth discrepancies 
among  the  analyzed  groups  of  countries  constitute, 
as Figure 4 proves, a stable phenomenon. We find the 
only noticeable exception to this rule in the first three 
years of the studied period. 
3.2. Financial system characteristics
The banks sold originate mainly, as illustrated by Fig-
ure 5 and Panel C in Table 1, from countries with a 
relatively modest level of financial intermediation. The 
mean ratio of banking sector assets to GDP in these 
countries equals 79% and is statistically significantly 
lower than in the other two groups examined in our 
study. As predicted by the corporate governance hy-
pothesis, selling parties in turn operate in the econo-
mies with the highest level of financial intermediation. 
The mean ratio of banking sector assets to GDP largely 
surpasses in those countries by 100%. 
In our sample, buyers come predominantly from the 
economies with well-developed open financial markets. 
Acquirers’ countries record, as documented by Figure 
6 and Panel D of Table 1, the highest ratios of stock 
market capitalization to GDP. However, in contrast to 
the case of the banking sectors, the differences in the 
means are not so striking. In reality, the difference be-
tween countries, where parent companies operate, and 
acquirers’ countries is not statistically significant and 
the differences calculated using the data from coun-
tries, where subsidiaries do business, are statistically Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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Panel A - GDP growth
Test t for equality of means
Means Subsidiary entity country Acquirer’s country
Parent company country 1.91% 6.02*** 3.79***
Acquirer’s country 2.95% 2.2**
Subsidiary entity country 3.64%
Panel B - GDP level
Test t for equality of means
Means (in USD) Subsidiary entity country Acquirer’s country
Parent company country 29212 9.00*** 5.17***
Acquirer’s country 24321 3.70***
Subsidiary entity country 19770
Panel C - Banking sector assets to GDP
Test t for equality of means
Means  Subsidiary entity country Acquirer’s country
Parent company country 115.1% 8.48*** 3.97***
Acquirer’s country 98.6% 4.41***
Subsidiary entity country 78.9%
Panel D - Stock market capitalization to GDP
Test t for equality of means
   Means  Subsidiary entity country Acquirer’s country
Parent company country 86.9% 1.69* 1.18
Acquirer’s country 92.9% 2.41**
Subsidiary entity country 77.4%
Panel E - Consumer price index
Test t for equality of means
Means  Subsidiary entity country Acquirer’s country
Parent company country 3.62% 2.47** 0.37
Acquirer’s country 3.84% 2.24**
Subsidiary entity country 5.18%
Panel F - Unemployment ratio
Test t for equality of means
Means  Subsidiary entity country Acquirer’s country
Parent company country 7.68% 4.01*** 3.61***
Acquirer’s country 8.98% 0.39
Subsidiary entity country 9.14%
Table 1. Mean values of the characteristics of the countries investigated and the test for equality of means
Source: Own study.36 K. Jackowicz, O. Kowalewski
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Figure 3. Mean GDP growth rates in consecutive years
Figure 4. Mean GDP per capita adjusted for differences in the purchasing power for subsequent years.
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Figure 5. Mean ratio of banking sector assets to GDP (in %) in consecutive years
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significant only at the 5% or 10% levels. Moreover, it is 
worth stressing that both Figure 6 and Figure 3 clearly 
show that modern economies and their financial mar-
kets are generally strongly correlated. 
3.3. Macroeconomic stability
We have already documented that countries, where the 
sold subsidiaries operate, are characterized by the high-
est real GDP growth. Figure 7 and Panel E of Table 1 
show that those countries exhibit also the fastest infla-
tion. The mean CPI equals for them 5.18% and it is sta-
tistically significantly higher at the 5% level than in the 
other two groups of countries. The difference in means 
between sellers’ and buyers’ countries, on the one hand, 
and countries hosting subsidiaries, on the other hand, 
amounts to 1.5 percentage point. Thus, the acquirers 
countries, contrary to the rebalancing hypothesis, are 
not statistically less stable than parent company coun-
tries as far as price dynamics is concerned. 
The same line of reasoning, as in the case of infla-
tion, can be applied to the second measure of macro-
economic  stability  we  use,  i.e.  unemployment  ratio. 
The means of unemployment ratio are presented in 
Panel F of Table 1. The evolution in time of this mea-
sure is described by Figure 8. Once again, the coun-
tries,  where  sold  subsidiaries  are  chartered,  are  the 
most unstable. However, the differences in means — as 
far as their economic significance is considered — are 
not extremely important. They do not surpass 1.5 per-
centage point. Although the economic significance of 
differences in means is limited, in 2 out of 3 cases, the 
differences are statistically significant.  The hypothesis 
of the weak performance this time is not supported by 
our empirical results since parent companies are char-
tered in countries, where on average, the unemploy-
ment rate is the lowest. 
The  empirical  evidence  of  countries,  from  which 
parent companies originate, and of countries, where 
subsidiaries operate is somewhat puzzling. The former 
group of countries reports the lowest GDP growth ra-
tios and, at the same time, the lowest unemployment 
ratios. The opposite is true for the latter group of coun-
tries. We think that this anomaly can be explained by 
the historical economic heritage. Some of the develop-
ing countries hosting subsidiaries simply started with 
the elevated unemployment ratios. 38 K. Jackowicz, O. Kowalewski
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Figure 6. Mean stock market capitalization to GDP (in %) in consecutive years
Figure 7. Mean consumer price indexes (CPI) in consecutive years
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Figure 8. Mean unemployment ratios in consecutive years.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
year
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
Acquirer unemployment
Subsidiary unemployment
Parent unemployment
Source: Own study.
Conclusions
In the article, we provide preliminary evidence on the 
role of external factors in the divestment process in 
banking. Using a large sample of 313 transactions, we 
have established that parent companies (selling par-
ties) originate from countries with a relatively high ac-
cumulated wealth, slow GDP growth, stable macroeco-
nomic  situation  and  dominant  bank  intermediation 
in the financial system. The acquirers, in turn, come 
from poorer countries with faster economic growth 
and relatively more market-oriented financial systems. 
Those results broadly conform with the predictions of 
three hypotheses formulated in the text. They form 
also a good base for future research since they indicate 
the external variables, which should be included in the 
formal models of divestiture decisions in banking. 
References
1.  Afshar, K.A., Taffler, R.J. & Sudarsanam, P.S. (1992). 
The Effect of Corporate Divestments on Sharehold-
er Wealth. The UK experience. Journal of Banking 
& Finance, 16, 115-135.
2.  Ahn, S. & Denis, D.J. (2004). Internal capital markets 
and investment policy: evidence from corporate spin-
offs. Journal of Financial Economics, 71,  489-516. 
3.  Brauer, M. (2006). What have we acquired and 
what should we acquire in divestiture research? A 
Review and Research Agenda, 32(6), 751-785.
4.  Burch,  T.R.  &  Nanda,  V.  (2003).  Divisional  di-
versity and the conglomerate discount: evidence 
from spin-offs. Journal of Financial Economics, 70, 
69-98.  
5.  Çolak, G. & Whited, T.M. (2007). Spin-offs, dives-
titures, and conglomerate Investment. The Review 
of Financial Studies, 20(3), 557-595.
6.  Decker, C. & Mellewigt, T. (2007a). The drivers and 
implications of business divestiture – and application 
and extension of prior findings. SFB 649 Discussion 
Paper, Humboldt –Universität zu Berlin. 
7.  Decker, C. & Mellewigt, T. (2007b). Thirty years 
after Michael E. Porter: What do we know about 
business exit ? Academy of Management Perspec-
tives, May, 41-55.
8.  Denis, D.J., Denis, D.K. & Sarin A. (1997). Agency 
problems, equity ownership, and corporate diversi-
fication. The Journal of Finance. 52(1), 135-160.
9.  Denis, D.J. & Kruse, T.A. (2000). Managerial disci-
pline and corporate restructuring following perfor-
mance declines. Journal of Financial Economics, 55, 
391-424. 40 K. Jackowicz, O. Kowalewski
10.5709/ce.1897-9254.10 DOI:  CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS
Vol. 5 Issue2 30-41 2011
10.  Gleason,  K.C.,  Mathur,  I.  &  Singh,  M.  (2000). 
Wealth effects for acquirers and divestors related 
to foreign divested assets. International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 9, 5-20. 
11.  Guedes, J. & Parayre R. (1997). Managerial reputa-
tion and divisional sell-offs: A model and empiri-
cal test. Journal of Banking and Finance, 21, 1085-
1106. 
12.  Hryckiewicz, A. & Kowalewski, O. (2010). The de-
terminants of the exit decisions of foreign banks. 
Banking and Finance Review, 2(2), 53-72.
13.  Hryckiewicz, A. & Kowalewski, O. (2011). Why 
do foreign banks withdraw from other countries. 
International Finance, 14, 67-102. 
14.  Leung, M., Young, T. & Fung, M.K. (2008). The 
entry and exit decisions of foreign banks in Hong 
Kong.  Managerial  and  Decision  Economics,  29,   
503-512. 
15.  Owen, S. & Yawson, A. (2006). Domestic or inter-
national: Divestitures in Australian multinational 
corporations. Global Finance Journal, 17, 282-293. 
16.  Zhou, Y.M., Li, X. & Svejnar, J. (2011). Subsidiary 
divestiture  and  acquisition  in  a  financial  crisis: 
Operational focus, financial constraints and own-
ership. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 272-287. Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
41 Divestments in Banking. Preliminary Evidence on the Role of External Factors